講座主題：Information Acquisition and Price Discrimination in Two-sided Duopoly Markets

主講嘉賓：鄭捷，清華大學經濟管理學院

講座時間：2022年7月5日14:00-16:00

講座地點：騰訊會議ID：315-682-021

嘉賓簡介：鄭捷，清華大學經濟管理學院副教授， Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副主編。研究領域為信息經濟學、産業經濟學、實驗經濟學、行為經濟學。研究成果發表于《經濟研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等國内外經濟學、管理學、自然科學各領域的知名期刊。

内容摘要：In this paper, we study platforms' information acquisition incentive and pricing strategy in a two-sided duopoly market. In stage 1, each platform decides whether to acquire information regarding consumers' preferences, which are characterized by the location of the consumer in a Hotelling setting. If a platform decides not to acquire information, its pricing strategy in the next stage will be uniform pricing. If a platform decides to acquire information, it can adopt a third-degree price discrimination, based on the acquired information, whose precision measured by the information partition is exogenously given. In stage 2, both platforms set their own prices based on the type of the pricing strategy. We characterize the equilibrium of the game, and show how precision of information affects platforms' incentive of information acquisition and the equilibrium outcome. We also conduct welfare analysis.