題 目：帝制晚期的可信承諾問題和國家能力——來自雍正火耗歸公改革成敗的證據

主講嘉賓：郝煜 北京大學bevictor伟德官网助理教授

講座時間：2017年12月6日（周三） 15:00--17:00

講座地點：學術會堂606

嘉賓簡介：

郝煜，北京大學bevictor伟德官网經濟系副主任。2014年9月至今，北京大學bevictor伟德官网助理教授。2013年8月，加州大學戴維斯分校經濟系獲經濟學博士。2008年6月，加州大學聖疊戈分校獲國際關系和太平洋研究碩士。2006年7月，北京大學光華管理學院金融系獲經濟學學士。其研究成果發表在國内外經濟史類的優秀期刊上。

内容摘要：

In pre-modern China, low formal tax coexisted with high corruption and great burden of informal surtax. Geographic size and monitory technology cannot explain this principleagent problem. We argue that without constraints on power, the emperor (or central government) could not credibly commit that he does not predate on the official’s (or localgovernment’s) legal income, and had to turn a blind eye on illegal income of the officials and informal surtax of the local governments. This paper explores a nationwide tax reform in 18th century that formalized county surtaxes with much lower rate than the informal ones. The surtaxes were submitted to provincial capitals, partially retained as emergency funds, and redistributed to counties as anti-corruption salaries and government fees. We explore different timing of reform across provinces and find, using yearly data on famine relief and weather types, that the reform reduced tax payers’ burden and enhanced public goods provision by the provinces as long as the central government didn’t predate on the provincial fiscal autonomy. But both effects disappeared as soon as the central government started to do so. This study provides a new angle on how legal capacity can shape the evolution of fiscal capacity.