講座主題：Full implementation and information aggregation

主講嘉賓：孫一飛對外經濟貿易大學

講座時間：2024年10月25日周五14:00

講座地點：bevictor伟德官网沙河校區11号樓308

嘉賓簡介：孫一飛，對外經濟貿易大學教授，博士生導師，國家級人才入選者，主要研究領域為博弈論與信息經濟學，側重于機制設計與實施理論，研究成果發表于Journal of Political Economy、Theoretical Economics、Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior等高水平國際期刊，主持并完成國家自然科學基金青年項目一項（結項獲評“特優”），面上項目一項，入選2023年中國信息經濟學會烏家培資助計劃。

内容摘要：The presence of asymmetric information presents significant challenges in designing mechanisms for achieving full implementation. These challenges stem from the exclusivity of private information, whereby agents with access to such information can manipulate their reports to their advantage. McLean andPostlewaite(2002) introduced the concept of information size to quantify the degree of exclusiveness of private information. In this study, we explore the full implementation problem in environments with varying information sizes. We demonstrate that in a special case where no agent can conceal their private information when aggregated with others' true information, full implementation of any social choice can be achieved through a two-stage mechanism in initial rationalizability. Additionally, we analyze the broader conflict and trade-off between the size of private information and the efficiency of achieving full implementation. Our findings underscore the intricate relationship between information asymmetry and mechanism efficiency in addressing asymmetric information scenarios.