講座主題：Effectiveness and Efficacy of R&D Subsidies: Estimating Treatment Effects with One-sided Noncompliance

主講嘉賓：Philipp Boeing（ZEW研究員及北京大學中國經濟研究中心客座助理教授）

講座時間：2019年4月16日（周二），下午2：00-3：30

講座地點：沙河校區主教508

嘉賓簡介：Philipp Boeing博士是德國ZEW歐洲經濟研究中心“創新與産業動态經濟學”研究部研究員。 此外，他還是北京大學國家發展研究院中國經濟研究中心的客座助理教授。 他的主要研究興趣是公司層面的創新經濟學，包括政策評估，研究活動的生産力效應和專利質量。 他目前的研究特别關注中國在創新驅動型經濟中的發展及其對歐洲的影響。

内容摘要：In evaluating the effectiveness of R&D subsidies, the literature so far has completely neglected the possibility of misappropriation of public funds. This paper contributes to the literature by evaluating the causal effect of R&D subsidies on R&D expenditures when monitoring is weak and misappropriation takes place due to moral hazard behavior. Our analysis is based on Chinese firm-level data for the period 2001-2011. Misappropriation is a major concern as we calculate that 42% of grantees misused R&D subsidies, corresponding to 53% of the total amount of R&D subsidies. In a setting with one-sided noncompliance to funding contract rules, we differentiate between the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect and the complier average causal effect (CACE). The ITT shows how effective the R&D policy was in practice when misappropriation exists. The CACE, in contrast, depicts how effective the policy could have been without misappropriation and thus is a measure for the efficacy of the R&D subsidy policy. Combining entropy balancing and IV methods to estimate both ITT and CACE, the ITT results show mild partial crowding out of R&D expenditures. Most strikingly, however, the CACE turns out to be more than twice as large as the ITT and confirms additionality of R&D subsidies. Thus, misappropriation of R&D subsidies considerably undermines the efficacy of Chinese R&D programs.